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Abstract 
Minorities hold a significantly smaller percentage of executive positions in companies 
within the S&P500. However, whether these minorities are under compensated relative to 
their non-minority counterparts has not been previously investigated. Using Compustat 
data, this paper documents the differences in compensation between minorities and non-
minorities as a whole, minority and non-minority CEOs, and the differences in 
compensation for minorities and non-minorities within industries. I show that there is no 
minority/white wage gap overall, and in some cases, minorities earn a premium compared 
to non-minorities.  
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1. Introduction  
Despite policies such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, the unfortunate fact remains that minorities still face 
employment and wage gaps in the United States. Further, these discrepancies carry into 
executive positions within Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) index, some of the most 
sought after jobs in America. What is particularly disheartening is that S&P500 is 
comprised of 500 widely help large-cap U.S. stocks from various industries, and 
minorities are underrepresented in these companies. Minorities hold a paltry percentage 
of these executive positions compared to non-minorities.12 
As the percentage of minorities holding executive positions in companies within 
the S&P 500 grows, an investigation of whether there is a narrowing of the wage 
discrepancy to coincide with the increased, albeit extremely minimal, entrance of more 
minorities is necessary. The fact that the minorities in these positions are so highly 
qualified may cause wage convergence between minorities and non-minorities. As such, I 
seek to answer if minorities earn less than their non-minority counterparts and whether 
this differential is more pronounced among CEOs relative to non-CEOs within the S&P 
500 as a whole. Further, I explore whether minorities earn less than their non-minority 
counterparts within industries.  Investigating the S&P 500 may serve to tell minorities 
which industries they should seek to work in. 
                                                          
1
 Minority employment rate in S&P 500 companies was 5.9% in 2008 and 6.0% in 2009.  
 
2
 An executive is defined as a minority if they are black, Hispanic, Asian, and Pacific Islander. 
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In summary, when examining the minority/white wage gap across industries, I 
find that minorities do not earn more than their non-minority counterparts when no 
controls are included in the analysis. However, minority CEOs earn a premium of over 
$2.7 million annually in total compensation compared to non-minority CEOs, but these 
results does not hold when the natural log of compensation is used. Further, I find that 
when the analysis is contingent on the Mining industry, minorities within six Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) industries earn less relative to their non-minority 
counterparts.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 will provide a review of 
relevant literature and research. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the 
estimation strategy and presents the results. Section 5 concludes.  
  
  
2. Literature Review 
 Minority workers face discrepancies in both employment and wages relative to 
white workers, and these discrepancies are relevant in every socio-economic class (see 
for example, Antecol and Bedard 2004; Black, Haviland, Sanders and Taylor 2001; 
Sundstrom 2007). Despite efforts to quell these differences with legislation, the issues of 
the minority/white unemployment gap and wage gap exist. Answers as to why these 
differences persist continues to be investigated. This paper integrates three major strands 
of literature: minority/white unemployment gap, minority/white wage gap, and 
minority/white executive gap in employment and wages.  
2.1 Minority/White Unemployment Gap 
The importance of the minority/white unemployment gap does not lie in the 
simple percentage difference between whites and minorities. Its very existence lends 
itself to a larger question: why does an unemployment gap between minorities and whites 
exist to begin with? Sundstrom (2007) finds that although the substantial and persistent 
gap between the unemployment rates of black and white males first became apparent in 
aggregate statistics covering the 1940s and 1950s, disaggregation exposes the fact that 
the gap had already materialized in urban areas before 1940 in the United States. Prior to 
1940 there was a minimal difference between the unemployment rates of black and white 
men. The racial unemployment gap relevant to today emerged during the ‘Great 
Migration’.3 Similarly, Fairlie and Sundstorm (1992) find that the roots of the current 
racial unemployment gap stem from the 1940s and 1950s when regional shifts in the 
                                                          
3
 The ‘Great Migration’ occurred in the 1940s and 1950s when many blacks moved from the rural South to 
urban areas in the North. 
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economy reduced the demand for labor in the South relative to other areas and led black, 
male workers to move to the urban areas of the North, where unemployment tended to be 
higher. The gap created by this shift proves to be a continual feature of regional labor 
markets within the United States. While these studies help to answer questions with 
regard to the black/white unemployment gap, they do not deal with other minorities.  
Bernstein et al. (1985) present research on the minority/white unemployment in 
the United States for males and females. Since the mid-1950s, minorities in the United 
States have suffered far higher joblessness than whites. Lindley (2005) uses data from the 
Quarterly Labor Force Survey for 1992-95 and 2000-03 to study changes in both ethnic 
minority economic activity and unemployment. Over this time span the unemployment 
conditions improved between minorities and whites, however, Lindley finds only half of 
the difference can be attributed to observed characteristics. Consequently, this implies the 
existence of a large, unexplained discriminatory element for most minorities.  
Fieldhouse (1999) contributes to the research on the minority/white 
unemployment gap for both genders with an examination of unemployment among ethnic 
minorities using the spatial mismatch theory.4 Specifically, he explores the geography of 
minority ethnic unemployment to assess the significance of the geographical distribution 
of ethnic minorities in understanding unemployment differences. Despite the fact that 
there is a relationship between unemployment and the area’s characteristics in which 
minorities live, it is not a result of the spatial mismatch of people and jobs. Selod and 
Zenou (2001) similarly delve into the spatial structure of minorities, in particular blacks. 
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 The spatial mismatch theory suggests employment opportunities for low-income minorities are located far 
away from places in which they live. 
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They find that the distance to jobs is crucial to the labor-market outcomes of 
ethnic minorities. Conversely, distance to jobs is less significant for whites because of 
their strong inherited advantage in terms of history. 
It is undeniable from the literature that there is a minority/white unemployment 
gap. However, all the causes behind this gap have yet to be determined. Historical 
factors, such as the ‘Great Migration’, distance to jobs and concentrations of minorities in 
certain areas all affect the gap, but do not fully explain it. Further research needs to be 
done in order to account for large, unexplained discriminatory element that affects most 
minorities so we can understand the racial wage gap. Unfortunately, the minority/white 
unemployment gap is not the only gap between whites and minorities that cannot be fully 
explained.  
2.2 Minority/White Wage Gap 
An equally important issue involves the wage gap that exists between minorities 
and whites. Agesa and Monaco (2006) seek to discover the reason behind this gap with 
the use of industry-level data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing 
Rotation Groups files from 1990 through 1996. They use this data to examine the 
relationship between skill level, market structure, and black employment. Agesa and 
Monaco (2006) find that racial wage gaps are smaller for low-skill workers than high-
skill workers and that wage gaps cause a larger increase in black employment for the 
low-skill group. However, these findings may be caused by the highly elastic labor 
supply of low-skill workers. 
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Hirsh and Schumacher (1992) explore the extent to which the wages of black and 
white workers of both genders diverge with respect to the racial composition of labor 
market. They find that the racial composition of labor markets is an important 
determinant of wage rates. Specifically, the wages of both white and black workers 
decrease with respect to the of ratio black and white workers within industry-occupation-
region cells. Additionally, the racial wage gap does not vary systematically with respect 
to racial density.  
This research is furthered by Hirsh and Macpherson (2004) who investigate the 
variance of wages between white and black workers within the racial composition of 
jobs. They find a narrowing of skill level between white and black workers is essential to 
abate the strong negative correlation between wages and the racial composition of jobs. 
These results suggest that the differences in workers’ skill level are the chief driving 
force behind the racial employment and wage disparity.  
Antecol and Bedard (2004) take a unique approach in exploring the youth male 
black/white and Mexican/white wage gap by looking at differences in labor force 
attachment and utilizing actual experience rather than just potential experience. Their 
research draws three main conclusions. First, the combination of labor force attachment 
and education explain 44-50 percent and 55-56 percent of black/white and Mexican/white 
wage gaps, respectively. Secondly, labor force attachment and education explain less of 
the black/white wage gap than the Mexican/white wage gap. Lastly, labor force 
attachment explains more of the black/white wage gap than the Mexican/white wage gap, 
whereas the opposite is true of education. 
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Unlike Antecol and Bedard, the following study does not concentrate on young 
minorities. Black et al. (2001) estimate wage differentials among the highly educated 
with the use of nonparametric matching methods and detailed measures of field of study 
for university graduates. They find that the racial wage gap is a result of differences in 
premarket factors such as age, the level and types of education, and English fluency 
and/or assimilation. Ultimately, they acknowledge that the reduction of the existing wage 
discrepancies lies in the removal of obstacles that impede skill acquisition by minority 
children and youth.  
The above literature concludes that major policy implementation in regards to the 
enhancement of training of minorities is necessary in order to close the minority/wage 
gap that is evident. Increased labor force attachment and educational improvements, in 
both quality and quantity, are imperative in order to have wage convergence between 
minorities and whites. Additionally, minorities need to diversify the fields in which they 
work. This is necessary because the greater the concentration of minorities in a certain 
labor market, the lower the wages tend to be. The combined understanding of 
unemployment gaps and wage gaps between minorities and whites is essential to further 
different avenues of research, including the potential discrepancies faced by executive 
minorities. 
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2.3 Minority/White Executive Gap in Employment and Wages 
Minorities hold a significantly smaller percentage of executive positions in top 
firms in North America because large firms are less likely to promote ethnic minorities.5 
However, there has not been a great deal of research on minority executive wage and 
employment gaps.6 Rather, much of the executive literature has focused on gender 
discrepancies. Bertrand and Hallock (2001) analyze gender differences in compensation 
among the top executives of many U.S. firms for the years 1992-97. They find that 
females, relative to males, earn about 45% less. However, much of the pay discrepancy 
can be attributed to the fact that women tended to manage smaller companies and were 
less likely to be CEOs. Further, the data showed that not only did females significantly 
increase their participation in executive positions during the time period, they also 
improved representation in larger corporations. This increased representation in larger 
corporations led to an improvement of relative compensation between males and females.  
My contribution is to bridge the literatures by using non-executive minority/white 
wage gap literature and applying it to the executive racial wage, employing techniques 
used to examine the male/female executive wage gaps. Specifically, I seek to answer if 
there is wage disparity within the S&P500 as a whole and whether certain industries are 
                                                          
5
 “Integrated but Unequal.” 1997. Economist 342 (8003) (02/08): 58-9.  
6A related study by Giuliano et al. (2009) uses personnel data from a large United States based retail firm to 
study whether or not the race or ethnicity of the hiring manager affects the racial composition of new hires. 
The results show that whites, Hispanics and Asians hire fewer black workers and more white workers than 
black hiring managers do. This finding is especially evident in the South. Also, locations with large 
Hispanic populations result in more Hispanic hiring managers, and these Hispanic managers hire more 
Hispanics and fewer whites than white managers do in these same areas.  
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more discriminatory than others. The next section describes the data used for the 
empirical analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3. Data 
The data I use for this analysis is Compustat data. This data is ideal for my 
purposes as it includes financial data (e.g. balance sheets, income statements, and cash 
flow statements) for over 24,000 companies.7 To account for executive compensation, I 
merge Compustat data with Compustat Executive Compensation data. Executive 
compensation is provided for, at minimum, the top five executives at each respective 
company, including the CEO. My paper examines executive compensation for the years 
2008 and 2009; therefore I look at companies that are incorporated in the S&P 500 index 
at the start of each of those years.   
Companies with incomplete financials (earnings per share, net income, revenue, 
and market value) are excluded from the analysis. A total of 104 companies and 646 
executives were dropped due to these restrictions, resulting in a final sample of 889 
companies and 4,866 executives.  
To find the minority statuses of the executives, the Notable Names Database 
(NNDB) is used in combination with company websites and Google images.  The NNDB 
is an intelligence aggregator that tracks the activities of people that creators have deemed 
to be noteworthy, both living and dead. The database has information about the person's 
curriculum vitae along with ethnicity. For individuals that are not found in the NNDB, 
company websites and Google images are used to gather minority status. The 
combination of these three tools allowed me to find the minority status of each executive. 
                                                          
7
 “WRDS,” Wharton University of Pennsylvania, accessed 03 March 2011, https://wrds-
web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/. 
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An executive is defined as a minority if they are black, Hispanic, Asian, and Pacific 
Islander, and otherwise zero. According to Table 1, 5.9 percent of the executives in the 
sample are minorities. This finding illustrates the under-representation of minorities in 
top executive positions.  
One dependent variable is used within the analysis. For my dependent variable, I 
collected executive compensation. Executive compensation is composed of seven 
categories: salary, bonus, other annual payments, restricted stock grants, Long Term 
Incentive Program (LITP) payouts, and all other compensation. Salary is dollar value of 
the base salary and the bonus is the dollar value of a bonus earned by an executive officer 
during the fiscal year.8 Other annual payments is the dollar value of other annual 
compensation not properly categorized as salary or bonus and includes perquisites and 
other personal benefits; above market earnings on restricted stock paid during the year 
but deferred by the executive; earnings on long-term incentive plan compensation paid 
during the year but deferred at the election of the officer; tax reimbursements; and the 
dollar value of difference between the price paid by the officer for company stock and the 
actual market price of the stock under a stock purchase plan.9 Restricted stock grants are 
the value of restricted stock granted during the year.10 LTIP payouts is the amount paid 
out to the executive under the company's long-term incentive plan, which measure 
company performance over a period of more than one year. 11 Finally, the portion of "All 
Other Compensation" includes items such as severance payments, debt forgiveness, 
                                                          
8
 “WRDS” 
9
 “WRDS” 
10
“WRDS” 
11
“WRDS” 
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imputed interest, payouts for cancellation of stock options, payment for unused vacation, 
tax reimbursements, and signing bonuses.12 Table 1 reveals that executives on average 
earn $4,732,930, but the spread in compensation is large, ranging from $1,611 to 
$214,791,000. In detail below, I discuss the differences in earnings by minority status in 
Section 3.1.  
Additionally, I include information about the executive’s personal characteristics 
(minority status, CEO status, and gender). I create an indicator variable equal to one if the 
executive is a minority, and a zero otherwise. I also create an indicator variable equal to 
one if the executive is a CEO, and a zero otherwise. Similarly, an indicator variable was 
created that equals one if the executive is female, and zero if the executive is male. 
Executives are roughly 53 years of age; of which 17.9 percent are CEOs and 6.5 percent 
are female (see Table 1). 
 The explanatory variables that represent company health are earnings per share, 
net income, revenue, and market value (see Table 1). Earnings per share functions as an 
indicator or a company’s profitability and is the portion of a company’s profit that is 
allocated to each outstanding share of common stock.13 Net income is a company’s total 
earnings and is an important measure of how profitable a company is over a period of 
time.14 Revenue is the amount of money that a company receives during a specific 
                                                          
12
 “WRDS” 
 
13
 “Earnings Per Share – EPS,” Investopedia, accessed 17 March 2011, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/eps.asp. 
14
 “Net Income - NI,” Investopedia, accessed 17 March 2011, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/netincome.asp. 
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period.15 Lastly, market value is the total dollar value of all of a company’s outstanding 
shares and is used to determine a company’s size.16 
 Finally, I create a set of indicator variables for industry.17 Specifically, I create 10 
indicator variables to represent each respective industry. These are based on the Standard 
Industrial Classification system.18 See Appendix Table 1 for detailed SIC code definitions 
and breakdown of observations within industries.19  
3.1 Executive Compensation by Minority Status 
 Table 2 presents the mean compensation for both minorities and non-minorities 
overall, for CEOs, and within industries. Overall, the difference in means between 
minorities and non-minorities is insignificant, but, CEO compensation has a significant 
difference in compensation for minorities and non-minorities. The mean compensation 
for minority CEOs is $13,234,300 compared to a mean of $4,651,796 for non-minority 
CEOs. Also, the Mining industry is the only industry that has a significant difference in 
compensation for minorities and non-minorities without any controls. Minorities, on 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
15
 “Revenue,” Investopedia,” accessed 17 March 2011, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/revenue.asp. 
16
 “Market Capitalization,” Investopedia, accessed 17 March 2011, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketcapitalization.asp. 
 
17
 An industry consists of a group of establishments primarily engaged in producing or handling the same 
product of group of products or in rendering the same services. 
 
18
 The SIC system served as the standard used by Federal statistical agencies in classifying business 
establishments for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the United 
States business economy for over 60 years before the induction of the North American Industry 
Classification System in 1997.  
 
19
 SIC industry 10, Public Administration, and industry 11, Management of Companies and Enterprises, are 
left out because no companies within the S&P500 during 2008 and 2009 have these codes.   
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average, are better compensated within the Mining industry compared to their non-
minority counterparts. Minorities have a mean compensation of $16,929,070, whereas 
non-minorities have a mean compensation of $4,692,695. 
The remainder of the paper formally analyzes the relationships in Table 2. The 
next section of this paper will describe the empirical analysis and results of this data. 
  
 
4. Estimation Strategy and Results  
 In order to determine whether minorities earn less than their non-minority 
counterparts and whether this differential is more pronounced among CEOs relative to 
non-CEOs, I estimate a regression in the following form:  
(1) Ci = α + βXi + δMINi  + ηCEOi + γMINi *CEOi + εi. 
In the above equation, C is compensation and X is a vector of personal characteristics 
(minority status, CEO status, gender, and age) and firm characteristics (earnings per 
share, net income, revenue, and market value). MIN is an indicator variable equal to one 
if the executive is a minority, and zero otherwise. CEO is also an indicator variable and is 
equal to one if the executive is a CEO, and zero if the executive is not. Lastly, ε is an 
error term with the usual properties.20  
 I estimate several specifications based on Equation (1). Specification 1 only 
includes the indicator variable for minority status. Specification 2 includes controls for 
CEO status in addition to Specification 1. Specification 3 includes Specification 2 as well 
as the cross term between Minority and CEO status. Specification 4 includes 
Specification 3 along with controls for personal characteristics. Finally, Specification 5 
includes Specification 4 plus controls for firm characteristics. The addition of variables in 
each specification serves to wipe out the limited effects the minority variable has on 
compensation. 
                                                          
20
 An error term is a variable in a statistical model that is created when the model does not fully represent 
the actual relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. As a result of this 
incomplete relationship, the error term is the amount at which the equation may differ during empirical 
analysis. 
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 Table 3 and 4 present the results of Specification 1 through 5 for compensation 
and the natural log of compensation, respectively. Using the natural log of compensations 
lessens the variance between observations and helps eliminate outliers. However, it may 
be important to include those outliers because they may reveal the true differences 
between minorities and non-minorities. As such, it is necessary to use both compensation 
and the natural log of compensation.  
 According to Table 3, minorities do not earn more than their non-minority 
counterparts when no controls are included in the analysis. However, when CEO status is 
added, minorities earn a premium over their non-minority counterparts equal to $853,600. 
Interestingly, when the CEO status is interacted with minority status, this earnings 
advantage is only enjoyed by minority CEOs relative to non-minority CEOs. Minority 
CEOs earn a premium of over $2.7 million annually in total compensation compared to 
non-minority CEOs (see Column 3). Moreover, this effect holds with the successive 
addition of variables. This suggests that when minorities attain CEO status, not only are 
they very good, but they are compensated accordingly. However, this result differs from 
previous racial wage gap literature. Typically, racial wage gap literature for non-
executives finds that there is a wage penalty for minorities compared to their non-
minority counterparts.  
 The same pattern is not found using the natural log of compensation (see Table 4). 
I argue this occurs because using the natural log results in the elimination of outliers in 
the sense that it causes the data to converge. The most highly compensated executive 
17 
 
within the S&P500 is a minority CEO, and using the natural log of compensation 
eliminates the effect that this observation has on results.  
 The results for the remaining variables are similar if one focuses on compensation 
versus the natural log of compensation, so I focus on the former. Furthermore, I focus on 
Specification 5, which includes the full set of control variables. Not surprisingly, CEOs 
earn more than their non-CEO counterparts. Specifically, a CEO makes over $6 million 
more than non-CEO executives within the S&P500. Age is also significant at the one 
percent level. With each additional year, an executive earns over 150,000 more dollars. 
Also, market value is the greatest predictor of the total compensation of the executives 
that work for that company. An interesting finding is that gender was not statistically 
significant at any level. Based on previous literature, it would be expected to find that 
women suffer a wage disparity relative to men.21 However, the fact that this is not 
statistically significant may be due to my analysis solely examining executives within the 
S&P500. As such, it may be that females in these positions are so highly qualified and 
unique that they no longer suffer from a wage gap.  
4.1 Industry Specific Minority Wage Gaps 
 In order to ascertain whether minorities earn less than their non-minority 
counterparts within industries, I estimate a regression of the following form: 
(2) Ci = α + βXi + δMINi  + ηCEOi + γMINi * CEOi + κSICi +  δMINi * SICi + εi. 
                                                          
21
 See Bertrand and Hallock (2001) 
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In the above equation, SIC is a vector of indicator variables for industry and all other 
variables are as defined in Equation (1). I estimate two specifications, one with all 
variables expect the cross terms between minority status and industry indicator variables, 
and one with those variables included.22 Moreover, I estimate Equation (2) for 
compensation and the natural log of compensation.  
 Table 5 and 6 present the results of Specification 1 and 2 for compensation and 
the natural log of compensation, respectively. Again, compensation and the natural log of 
compensation are both utilized for the same reasons as listed above.   
 According to Table 5, when the cross terms between minority status and industry 
indicator variables are absent, minority executives do not earn more than non-minorities. 
Interestingly, when the cross terms between minority status and industry indicator 
variables are included, minorities earn a premium compared to non-minorities. In 
Specification 2, minority compensation is greater than non-minority compensation by 
$10,423,000. Additionally, in Specification 1, the Construction industry is significant 
unlike in Specification 2. When the cross terms between minority status and industry 
indicator variables are not included, executives working within the Construction industry 
earn $1,922,000 less than executives who work in other industries. The remaining 
variables that Specification 1 and Specification 2 have in common are similar, so I will 
focus on specification 2.  
                                                          
22
 The Public Administration industry is not included because there are no observations. Also, the Mining 
industry is not included as well in order to make the results contingent on this industry. No minorities work 
within the Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing industry and Nonclassified Establishments. As a result, no 
minsic_1 and minsic_11were created. Again, minsic_2 is not included to make the regression results 
contingent on this industry. 
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As expected, similar to the results of testing standard compensation across 
industries, CEOs earn a premium over non-CEOs ($6,012,000), minority CEOs have a 
higher compensation level than non-minority CEOs ($3,693,000), and each additional 
year increases an executive’s compensation ($154,000). What is unique to note are the 
effects of the minority status and industry indicator variable cross terms. When the 
minority status is interacted with industry indicator variables, the minority executives 
within each respective industry earn less than their non-minority counterparts; despite the 
fact that overall minorities earn more than non-minority executives (see Column 2).23  
The results when using the natural log of compensation were not the exactly the 
same as when using just compensation (see Table 6). Once more, I contend this is the 
case because using the natural log results in the elimination of outliers in the sense that it 
causes the data to converge, and the most highly compensated executive within the 
S&P500 is a minority CEO. Like in compensation, CEOs earn more than non-CEOs and 
age results in higher earnings when using the natural log of compensation. However, the 
natural log of compensation differs because minorities CEOs no longer have a premium 
over their non-minority CEO equivalents. When Ln compensation is used under 
Specification 2, the only cross term between minority status and industry indicator 
variable that is significant is the Retail Trade industry. The following section provides 
concluding remarks. 
                                                          
23
 All minority status and industry indicator cross terms are significant at the one percent level except for 
the Wholesale Trade industry, which is statistically insignificant.   
  
 
5. Conclusion 
 This paper contributes to the racial wage gap literature by bridging non-executive 
minority/white wage gap literature and applying it to the executive racial wage, 
employing techniques used to examine the male/female executive wage gaps. 
Specifically, I answered if there is wage disparity within the S&P500 as a whole and 
whether certain industries are more discriminatory than others. While the results differ in 
regards to minority compensation when the natural log of compensation is used in lieu of 
standard compensation, there are three key consistencies. Minorities do not suffer from a 
wage disparity compared to non-minorities overall, CEOs are always better compensated 
than non-CEOs, and each yearly increase of age raises the amount that an executive is 
compensated.  
When compensation is used, I find that minority CEOs are better compensated 
than their non-minority CEO counterparts. This result suggests that when minorities 
achieve this level, they are not only highly qualified but compensated according to their 
unique abilities that merit such high compensation levels. However, this result does not 
hold when the natural log of compensation is used. In addition, I documented the effects 
of industry classification has on compensation for minorities. I find that within certain 
industries there is a wage disparity between minorities and non-minorities when the 
results are contingent on the Mining industry.24   
 The research in this paper provides insight into executive compensation as it 
relates to the minority/white wage gap. The significance of my findings could be 
                                                          
24
 The most highly compensated minority executive is a CEO of a company within the Mining industry.  
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increased by looking at a broader range of years which would increase the number of 
companies and top executives in the sample. Additionally, with a larger data range, there 
could be a more detailed industry break down. Overall, the results of this paper suggest 
that minorities who are employed in S&P 500 companies are not undercompensated 
relative to non-minorities. As such, minorities must seek to become more prevalent in 
these companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
6. Tables 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Comp 4866 4732.93 8161.808 1.661 214791 
LnComp 4866 7.950896 0.9594315 0.50742 12.2774 
Minority 4866 0.058981 0.2356128 0 1 
CEO 4866 0.178997 0.3833893 0 1 
MinCEO 4866 0.009453 0.0967776 0 1 
Gender 4866 0.064529 0.2457189 0 1 
Age 4866 53.30991 6.726895 33 91 
EPS 4866 1.840288 3.440452 -29.72 22.29 
NetIncome 4866 1049.709 3264.193 -16998 45220 
TotalRev 4866 17967.49 35804.52 549.07 425071 
MrktValue 4866 19190.38 35501.31 548.749 397234 
sic_1 4866 0.004316 0.0655585 0 1 
sic_2 4866 0.084464 0.2781104 0 1 
sic_3 4866 0.014797 0.1207502 0 1 
sic_4 4866 0.443896 0.4968935 0 1 
sic_5 4866 0.078093 0.2683453 0 1 
sic_6 4866 0.017468 0.1310211 0 1 
sic_7 4866 0.103781 0.305008 0 1 
sic_8 4866 0.083436 0.2765687 0 1 
sic_9 4866 0.165228 0.3714245 0 1 
sic_11 4866 0.004521 0.0670943 0 1 
minsic_2 4866 0.003288 0.0572537 0 1 
minsic_3 4866 0.001233 0.0350967 0 1 
minsic_4 4866 0.029182 0.1683339 0 1 
minsic_5 4866 0.003494 0.0590097 0 1 
minsic_6 4866 0.000206 0.0143355 0 1 
minsic_7 4866 0.00596 0.0769767 0 1 
minsic_8 4866 0.003083 0.0554413 0 1 
minsic_9 4866 0.012331 0.1103672 0 1 
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Table 2: Compensation by Minority Status Overall, within CEO, and within 
Industry 
Variable Minority Non-minority 
Overall 5410.992 
(806.6428) 
4690.43 
(113.6024) 
CEO 13234.33*** 
(4564.079) 
4651.796*** 
(109.3233) 
SIC 2: Mining 16929.07*** 
(13321.08) 
4692.695*** 
(108.9402) 
SIC 3: Construction 3073.923 
(1141.076) 
4734.978 
(117.1383) 
SIC 4: Manufacturing 5092.146 
(558.9892) 
4722.132 
(119.3488) 
SIC 5: Transportation, 
Communications and Public 
Utilities 
2647.073 
(335.9657) 
4740.242 
(117.3951) 
SIC 6: Wholesale Trade 605.099 
 
4733.778 
(117.0249) 
SIC 7: Retail Trade 5348.944 
(885.2965) 
4729.236 
(117.5878) 
SIC 8: Finance, Insurance, 
and Real Estate 
4495.445 
(1192.206) 
4733.664 
(117.3115) 
SIC 9: Services 4510.366 
(572.9277) 
4735.708 
(118.2517) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***Difference between Minority and Non-minority means are significant at p<0.001 or better 
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Table 3: Determinants of Compensation (OLS Coefficients and Standard Errors) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Comp Comp Comp Comp Comp Comp 
       
Minority 720.6 853.6* 404.9 402.0 612.2 330.3 
 
(496.6) (471.5) (514.7) (514.7) (510.6) (499.4) 
CEO  6,686*** 6,536*** 6,513*** 6,012*** 6,015*** 
 
 (289.8) (297.8) (298.7) (300.7) (293.9) 
MinCEO   2,781** 2,834** 3,214** 3,531*** 
 
  (1,281) (1,282) (1,272) (1,243) 
Gender    -465.7 -224.6 -121.4 
 
   (453.4) (450.0) (440.0) 
Age     157.7*** 151.7*** 
 
    (16.70) (16.36) 
EPS      67.35* 
 
     (37.59) 
NetIncome      -0.148** 
 
     (0.0691) 
TotalRev      0.000847 
 
     (0.00446) 
MrktValue      0.0553*** 
 
     (0.00648) 
Constant 4,690*** 3,486*** 3,513*** 3,547*** -4,801*** -5,520*** 
 
(120.6) (125.8) (126.4) (130.6) (893.3) (879.4) 
 
      
Observations 4,866 4,866 4,866 4,866 4,866 4,866 
R-squared 0.000 0.099 0.100 0.100 0.116 0.157 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Determinants of Ln Compensation (OLS Coefficients and Standard 
Errors) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES LnComp LnComp LnComp LnComp LnComp LnComp 
 
      
Minority 0.0662 0.0874* 0.0794 0.0790 0.101* 0.0607 
 
(0.0584) (0.0528) (0.0577) (0.0577) (0.0573) (0.0545) 
CEO  1.066*** 1.064*** 1.061*** 1.009*** 1.011*** 
 
 (0.0325) (0.0334) (0.0335) (0.0338) (0.0321) 
MinCEO   0.0498 0.0564 0.0953 0.156 
 
  (0.144) (0.144) (0.143) (0.136) 
Gender    -0.0578 -0.0331 -0.0174 
 
   (0.0508) (0.0505) (0.0480) 
Age     0.0161*** 0.0148*** 
 
    (0.00187) (0.00179) 
EPS      0.0182*** 
 
     (0.00410) 
NetIncome      -2.57e-05*** 
 
     (7.54e-06) 
TotalRev      2.09e-06*** 
 
     (4.87e-07) 
MrktValue      7.39e-06*** 
 
     (7.07e-07) 
Constant 7.947*** 7.755*** 7.755*** 7.760*** 6.905*** 6.793*** 
 
(0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0146) (0.100) (0.0960) 
 
      
Observations 4,866 4,866 4,866 4,866 4,866 4,866 
R-squared 0.000 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.194 0.273 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Determinants of Compensation including SIC Controls (OLS Coefficients 
and Standard Errors) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Comp Comp 
   
Minority 344.3 10,324*** 
 (498.3) (1,850) 
CEO 6,010*** 6,012*** 
 (292.9) (292.2) 
MinCEO 3,442*** 3,693*** 
 (1,239) (1,248) 
Gender -34.56 -10.84 
 (439.3) (438.3) 
Age 154.2*** 154.0*** 
 (16.39) (16.36) 
EPS 59.21 54.66 
 (38.02) (38.05) 
NetIncome -0.125* -0.129* 
 (0.0693) (0.0692) 
TotalRev 0.00451 0.00415 
 (0.00465) (0.00465) 
MrktValue 0.0514*** 0.0522*** 
 (0.00659) (0.00659) 
sic_1 950.9 1,332 
 (1,676) (1,673) 
sic_3 -1,922** -1,313 
 (959.3) (996.0) 
sic_4 -1,831*** -1,396*** 
 (404.1) (411.4) 
sic_5 -2,820*** -2,432*** 
 (533.1) (542.8) 
sic_6 -3,372*** -3,073*** 
 (896.9) (900.0) 
sic_7 -1,972*** -1,597*** 
 (510.4) (519.7) 
sic_8 -2,335*** -1,962*** 
 (525.6) (534.3) 
sic_9 -1,357*** -882.1* 
 (456.1) (465.8) 
sic_11 -3,553** -3,178* 
 (1,673) (1,670) 
minsic_3  -12,761*** 
  (3,682) 
minsic_4  -10,728*** 
  (1,956) 
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Table 5 (Continued)  
 
  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Comp Comp 
   
minsic_5  -9,886*** 
  (2,615) 
minsic_6  -11,181 
  (7,721) 
minsic_7  -9,700*** 
  (2,331) 
minsic_8  -9,757*** 
  (2,693) 
minsic_9  -11,268*** 
  (2,101) 
Constant -3,904*** -4,278*** 
 (954.7) (955.4) 
   
Observations 4,866 4,866 
R-squared 0.164 0.170 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Determinants of Ln Compensation including SIC Controls (OLS 
Coefficients and Standard Errors) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES LnComp LnComp 
   
Minority 0.0517 -0.116 
 (0.0542) (0.202) 
CEO 1.011*** 1.011*** 
 (0.0319) (0.0319) 
MinCEO 0.134 0.134 
 (0.135) (0.136) 
Gender -0.0114 -0.0126 
 (0.0478) (0.0478) 
Age 0.0150*** 0.0151*** 
 (0.00178) (0.00178) 
EPS 0.0185*** 0.0183*** 
 (0.00414) (0.00415) 
NetIncome -2.39e-05*** -2.37e-05*** 
 (7.54e-06) (7.55e-06) 
TotalRev 2.82e-06*** 2.77e-06*** 
 (5.06e-07) (5.07e-07) 
MrktValue 6.60e-06*** 6.64e-06*** 
 (7.17e-07) (7.18e-07) 
sic_1 0.214 0.206 
 (0.182) (0.182) 
sic_3 -0.0261 -0.00298 
 (0.104) (0.109) 
sic_4 -0.0176 -0.0210 
 (0.0440) (0.0449) 
sic_5 -0.204*** -0.215*** 
 (0.0580) (0.0592) 
sic_6 -0.629*** -0.621*** 
 (0.0976) (0.0982) 
sic_7 -0.142** -0.162*** 
 (0.0555) (0.0567) 
sic_8 -0.159*** -0.170*** 
 (0.0572) (0.0583) 
sic_9 0.00113 -0.00688 
 (0.0496) (0.0508) 
sic_11 -0.286 -0.293 
 (0.182) (0.182) 
minsic_3  -0.192 
  (0.402) 
minsic_4  0.122 
  (0.213) 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 
  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES LnComp LnComp 
   
minsic_5  0.278 
  (0.285) 
minsic_6  -0.759 
  (0.842) 
minsic_7  0.431* 
  (0.254) 
minsic_8  0.281 
  (0.294) 
minsic_9  0.187 
  (0.229) 
Constant 6.842*** 6.845*** 
 (0.104) (0.104) 
   
Observations 4,866 4,866 
R-squared 0.285 0.286 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
7. Appendix 
Table 1: SIC Code Definitions 
SIC Code Industry Title Number of 
Observations 
Minorities Within 
SIC CODE 
1 Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Fishing 
21 0 
2 Mining 411 16 
3 Construction 72 6 
4 Manufacturing 2,160 142 
5 Transportation, 
Communications and 
Public Utilities 
380 17 
6 Wholesale Trade 85 2 
7 Retail Trade 505 29 
8 Finance, Insurance, 
and Real Estate 
406 15 
9 Services 804 60 
10 Public 
Administration 
0 0 
11 Nonclassified 
Establishments 
22 0 
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